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THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT: THE COMPENSATION OF
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT VICTIMS FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
P.T. Muchlinski"
The present paper seeks to ask a general question in a particular
context. The question concerns the extent to which multinational
enterprises (MNEs) can be accountable at law for activities that result
in a violation of the right to development as a human right; the context
is that of compensation for the victims of major industrial accidents in
less developed countries (LDCs), of which the Bhopal gas leak of 3-4
December 1984 is the most notorious example.
The liability of a MNE for violations of the right to development
as a human right raises an initial problem as to whether a nonstate
entity, such as a corporation, has any responsibilities at all in the field
of human rights. This issue will be addressed in the first section of
the paper, along with the difficult question of the relevance and utility
of characterising issues, such as those surrounding the health and
safety aspects of industrial operations run by MNEs in LDCs, as
human rights issues.
Thereafter, the paper will concentrate on the problems involved
with the compensation of victims of industrial accidents in LDCs.
Under this heading it will deal, first, with the limitations of existing
legal approaches to this matter, which have been vividly highlighted
in the Bhopal litigation. Secondly, the paper will introduce a
speculative new proposal for the compensation of victims of major
industrial accidents arising out of the operations of MNEs in LDCs.
This takes the form of a transnational fund which can offer immediate
compensation on a no-fault basis, and which seeks to establish a new
system of accountability for MNEs as regards the safety of their
operations in LDCs. The role and utility of human rights standards
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in such a scheme will be considered to see whether the proposed fund
can offer more than merely a "band-aid" approach, concentrating on
compensation for industrial accidents, and act as an institution for
furthering economic and social development in the field of industrial
safety in LDCs.
I. The Liability of MNEs for Violations of the
Right to Development as a Human Right
As a corporation in municipal law, a MNE has no separate legal
personality at international law.' Consequently, a MNE can become
the subject of international rights and duties only if this is- the effect
of an international convention between states.
In the field of international human rights law, while there exist
instruments and conventions that permit a legal person to bring a
complaint that its rights have been violated against a signatory state,2
no international instrument or convention places a duty upon a private
legal person to observe fundamental human rights, or to answer
complaints as to such non-observance.
There appears to be only one case in which acts, carried out in the
name of a private legal person, could amount to a violation of
international human rights law. This occurs where the natural
persons, who direct the corporation, are accused of committing an
international crime, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against
humanity in the course of their control of that entity.3 Such a case is
perhaps better seen as an instance of personal rather than corporate
1. 1. Brownlie Principles of Public Internatlonal Law (4th ed. 1990) p. 67. In legal terms the
MNE consists of a series of national companies and or branches whose controlling sharehold or
owner is the foreign incorporated parent company.
2. See, e.g., Art. 1. Protocol. 1. of the European Convention on Human Rights: "Every
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions" (emphasis added).
Ibid. Art. 25(1): "The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the secretary-General of
the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth
in this Convention...." See too the Sunday Times Case Judgement Eur. Ct. HR 26 April 1979.
(Applicants included a newspaper corporation.) See too Art. 44 of the Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights.
3. See further Brownlie op. cit. pp. 561-564.
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responsibility. 4 However, the Nuremberg Tribunal5 did consider
the nature of the responsibility for war crimes and crimes against
humanity of certain Nazi organisations. Of these the Gestapo and 55
were declared criminal. This may suggest that corporate responsibility
for war crimes and crimes against humanity is possible. Nevertheless,
this analogy is not very helpful in relation to a private company and
its responsibility for harm caused in the conduct of its lawful
commercial activities. Such activities do not amount to a conspiracy
to commit international crimes under existing principles of
international law.
The existing machinery for the protection of human rights does
not envisage the private legal person as a respondent. Only the states
parties to the relevant convention or instrument are contemplated as
respondents to complaints.6 However, the so-called "Drittwirkung"
doctrine may be capable of invoking human rights principles against
private legal persons.
This doctrine accepts that certain constitutionally protected
fundamental human rights, whose main purpose is to protect the
individual from the state, can also be invoked in relations between
individuals, particularly against large-scale private organisations
holding considerable economic and social power.7 In the opinion of
Sir Vincent Evans this theory could be applied to, inter alia, MNEs:
It is recognised that the European Convention was essentially intended to
protect the fundamental rights of the individual in his relations with the
State. However, it appears that there is now a move towards the concept
that certain human rights need to be protected and can be invoked, not
only against public authorities but also against private persons, groups and
organisations, and to relate constitutional and Convention rights to
4. For example, the 1948 Genocide Convention UKTS 58 (1971) Cmnd. 4421 Art. IV.
mentions only "persons," not "natural or legal persons." But see § 5 and Sched. I. of the UK
Interpretation Act 1978 which takes the word "person," when it appears in a statute, to include
a legal person unless the context otherwise requires.
5. See 41 American Journal of International Law 172 (1947).
6. See Art. 25(1) European Convention on Human Rights; Art. 44. Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights.
7. See further Andrew Z. Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic
Law (Oxford Universtiy Press 1983) Ch. 8.
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relations between them. This trend is encouraged by a growing awareness
that in modem life the traditional human rights are increasingly threatened
by new dangers from e.g. multi-national corporations [emphasis
added], mass media, mechanical devices (such as data banks) and other
phenomena of a private nature and consequently should be protected erga
omnes.
8
However, there is little decided case-law or other precedent on the
international level to establish the "drittwirkung" concept as a
principle of international human rights law. Thus, under the European
Convention on Human Rights, individual applications directed against
private persons are inadmissible ratione personae. 9 At most the
Convention may create indirect obligations for individuals by obliging
the state authorities to protect individuals from one another, and to
ensure that violations of human rights do not arise as a result of
private action. 10  The state can respond by enacting positive
obligations for private persons to observe human rights standards
under the laws of the state in question.
From the above, it appears that no rule of international law, nor
any international institutional structure, imposes duties directly upon
private legal persons to observe fundamental human rights and to
8. Written Communication to the Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights
in Relation to other International Instruments for the Protection of Human Rights (Strasbourg 1979)
1 3.44.
9. See Article 25.
10. See Articles 17 and 13 of the Convention to support this analysis. See Drzemczewski,
op.cit. p. 220. See too his analysis of the Convention and his analysis of such case-law as may be
relevant, especially: National Union of Belgian Police Case Commission Report 27 May 1974 1
59; Deweer v Belgium, Eur. Ct. HR Judgement 27.2.80 1 49; Young James & Webster v United
Kingdom Commission Report 14.12.79 11 168, 169. See too ibid. Judgement Eur. Ct. HR 13.8.81
1 49. (All citations can be found in Drzemcewski at p.221-224.) Most recently the European court
of Human Rights has held that Art. 5 of the Convention is inapplicable to a case where a
deprivation of liberty of a child results from the action of a private person, the mother, in the
exercise of her custodial rights in the interest of her child: Neilson Case 7/1987/130/181 Judgement
28.11.88 1 73. However it would be wrong to read this case as conclusive authority against the
power to invoke the Convention in relation to the acts of private persons. The Court's decision
turns on the fact that the mother's decision to deprive the liberty of her child amounted to a
responsible exercise of her custodial rights in the interest of her child. It is unclear whether Art.
5. would have been inapplicable if there was evidence of improper motive and/or conduct on the
part of the mother. The case is, therefore, equivocal on the issue of "drittwirkung": it neither
supports nor denies the principle.
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answer for violations thereof, save, possibly, in the field of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Only with the creation of a new
international institutional structure, accepting the applicability of
international human rights norms to private natural and/or legal
persons, will international human rights law be applied to the activities
of such persons. In the absence of such a development, the only other
possibility is the unlikely case of holding the state responsible for
failure to regulate the activities of private persons, in a manner that
protects human rights under the unsettled "drittwirkung" doctrine.
The further question arises: is it necessary to extend human rights
standards to private corporations in order to regulate matters such as
the compensation of victims of major industrial accidents in LDCs? A
strong case can be made for the use of such standards when judging
the health and safety activities of MNEs." First, human rights
standards offer a body of internationally accepted obligations which
inform public policy concerning the treatment of human beings in
political, social and economic contexts. As such, they act as the
foundation for more technical legal norms that seek to operationalise
those standards, and as the measure of success or failure of resulting
policies. Thus, the object of any policy of industrial and
environmental health and safety can be described as the preservation
of the human rights to life, liberty and security of person, the right to
health, to an adequate standard of living,12 and to the peaceful
enjoyment of property. The failure to uphold these rights would
indicate a failure of policy. Secondly, human rights standards can be
referred to as a means of articulating political concern with the
absence of effective control over the activities of MNEs, especially
where these activities result in large-scale loss of life and personal
injury. Human rights standards have, therefore, an important
hortatory role to play, a role which can result in concrete policy and
legal developments. 3
11. For a valuable statement of the case for applying human rights standards to the activities
of MNEs see M.R. Anderson "State Obligations in a Transnational Dispute: The Bhopal Case"
Paper delivered at the Anglo-Soviet Symposium on International Law, Institute of State and Law,
Moscow, May 1990 (publication forthcoming).
12. Anderson, ibid. p. 8.
13. Anderson, ibid. pp. 20-23.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1993
However, appeals to human rights standards can act as no more
than the beginning of a policy concerning the accountability of MNEs
for the conduct of hazardous industrial activities in LDCs. Human
rights standards do not offer detailed solutions to the numerous
practical and legal problems that arise in the context of a major
industrial accident in an LDC, involving the operations of a foreign
owned and controlled corporation. To these we now turn, using the
Bhopal case as an illustrative example.
H. The Difficulties Surrounding Existing Legal Responses to
Major Industrial Accidents in LDCs Involving MNEs1W 4
The Bhopal case has shown how inadequate private litigation can
be in providing swift and effective compensation to the victims of
major industrial accidents in developing countries. Although such
accidents happen in developed countries, the legal and insurance
consequences of such an accident are likely to be more unfavourable
to the victims in a developing country.
In particular, the majority, or far fewer of the victims are unlikely
to possess life or personal injury insurance. They must therefore rely
on other sources of compensation, such as litigation with the defendant
corporation.
This raises many problems. First, if the defendant is a MNE
there will be difficulties over the choice of forum and choice of
applicable law. Secondly, there are problems concerning the legal
basis of the corporation's liability. Should liability be strict or based
on fault? Should the foreign parent company be responsible for the
acts of its subsidiary? Thirdly, even if the corporation is found liable
it may be underinsured and so unable to meet its liability. Fourthly,
14. This section, and section (3) of the paper below, are based on a paper, written by the
author, setting out in greater detail the technical legal problems involved in establishing the
proposed fund. See Muchlinski, "The Right to Development and the Industralisation of Less
Developed Countries: The Case of Compensation for Major Industrial Accidents Involving Foreign-
Owned Corporations," published in November 1989 by the Human Rights Unit of the
Commonwealth Secretariat. Copies can be obtained by writing to: The Human Rights Unit, The
Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London SWIY 5HX.
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the home and host countries may take sides in the litigation and use
their legal systems to protect their nationals in a way that undermines
legal impartiality.
Furthermore, a host country may discourage litigation against a
foreign corporation if it is concerned that a finding against the
corporation might be construed as an act hostile towards foreign
investors.
These facts suggest that a new system of dealing with major
industrial accident compensation in LDCs is needed. It must be
supranational in nature, so as to avoid conflicts between home and
host countries. The new system needs to provide a readily available
source of funds from which compensation can be paid as soon as
possible after the accident. An international fund set up for this
purpose is desirable.
HL An International Compensation Fund
The use of an international compensation fund is not
unprecedented. The most significant example occurs in the field of oil
pollution from ships. Here both private and public sector funds have
been established. On the public side, there is the International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund set up by Convention in 1971, as
amended in 1984.15 This has the force of English law under Part I
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1974. The Fund provides compensation
to victims of oil pollution whose losses have not been covered under
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
damage 1969, as amended in 1984.16 The Fund Convention has set
up an international organisation, the IOPC Fund, to administer the
system. The Fund is financed by contributions from those who
receive, in a contracting state, "contributing oil", which the Fund
Convention defines as crude and fuel oils. Contributors are those who
have received in the relevant calendar year more than 150,000 metric
15. See D.W. Abecassis and R.L. Jarashow, Oil Pollution From Ships (2nd ed. Stevens and
Sons 1985) Ch. 11.
16. See ibid. ch. 10. This convention was enacted into English law by the Merchant Shipping
(Oil Pollution) Act 1971.
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tonnes of contributing oil. Thus it is mainly oil companies and the
owners of power plants that contribute.17
Claims can be made by anyone who has suffered "pollution
damage" within the meaning of the Liability Convention but who
cannot recover under the terms of that Convention, or because the
shipowner liable for damages under the Liability Convention is
financially incapable of meeting his obligations, or because the damage
suffered goes beyond the Liability Convention limits. The claim will
usually be made after the shipowner has paid money into a limitation
fund covering his liability up to the Convention limit. Procedures
exist for claims to be made even before the shipowner has done so."'
Nonetheless, it is fair to describe the Fund as a "last stop"
compensation system.
On the private side, the major oil companies have set up their own
scheme for the compensation of oil pollution victims. Known as
CRISTAL, 9 it establishes a fund which is held by a company
incorporated in Bermuda and to which the member companies
contribute a proportion of their receipts of crude and fuel oil. The
fund will pay compensation to any person who has suffered oil
pollution damage as a result of an incident.20 This scheme can also
be described as a "last stop" system. It will only pay on proof that
the claimant has exhausted all other means of obtaining recovery.
These precedents can be modified to offer a useful model for a
fund in the field of hazardous manufacturing industries operating in
LDCs. First, a major contribution from the private sector to such a
fund is essential. However, public sector contributions from the
participating states should also be made. This is important as both
home and host states have a responsibility to oversee industrial safety.
17. Ibid. 1 11-60.
18. Ibid. 11 11-50to 11-51.
19. Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution.
20. On CRISTAL see Abecassis and Jarashow, op. cit. note 15 above 11 12-21 to 12-38 and
CRISTAL: "Memorandum of Explanation Cristal Contract Rules of Cristal Limited" (revised
February 20 1989), obtainable from Cristal Services Limited, London. See too by the same body:
"TOVALOP and CRISTAL A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation" which explains the relationship
between Cristal and the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP), the private sector equivalent to the 1969 Liability Convention.
COMPENSATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT VICTIMS 197
Furthermore, a public contribution may be necessary to avoid any
shortfall of funds raised from the private sector.
Secondly, the proposed fund should not operate as a "last stop"
system operating only after litigation has ended, in the manner of the
oil pollution funds. Given the absence of widespread personal
insurance in developing countries, which could offer immediate
compensation for the victims and allow the insurer to continue
litigation against the defendant corporation, the need is for a "first
stop" approach whereby the proposed fund acts as the initial source of
compensation.
The major practical obstacle to the development of an effective
fund concerns its size. It must be large enough to cope with any
foreseeable claims. Apart from the obligation on participating states
and corporations to make substantial contributions, it would be
valuable to give the body administering the fund the legal capacity and
powers to use a proportion of its deposits as investment capital.
However, a further power must be given to the fund to make
emergency calls on contributors, in the case of an accident of
unforeseeable dimensions.
The fund should be incorporated as a company wholly owned by
the international organisation that would need to be set up as its
supervisory body.2 Incorporation should take place in the most
legally favourable jurisdiction, either an established "tax haven" or a
participating state that offers special tax concessions to the fund. Its
tasks would be to invest the fund prudentially and to ensure that an
adequate reserve for the payment of claims was available. It would
also be charged with the task of conducting any litigation against
defendant corporations and/or states in the exercise of its rights of
21. The proposed international organisation could be expected to follow the model set up in
the oil pollution field. Thus there would be a Secretariat, charged with the administration of the
organisation, and composed of persons with relevant experience in those fields required for the
effective operation of the organisation. In particular, it would be important to draw on persons with
experience in the insurance industry and in industries using ultrahazardous technology. Secondly,
there would be an Assembly of all the contacting states, which would give policy guidance to the
organisation. Provision should also be made for industry representatives to take an active part in
the fund, so as to avoid disinterest and possible opposition to its work. Collaboration with the
international insurance industry may also have to be formally provided for. The operational bodies
of the organisation would be the fund company and the claims commission (see below).
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subrogation after payment of claims.22 The fund company would be
administered by officials of the international organisation and
supervised by it.
Ideally, the fund should become largely self-financing, with the
proportion of private and public contributions going down as
investment income goes up. This is important as neither the
participating states nor the contributing corporations are likely to be
very enthusiastic givers. If their contributions can be reduced over
time without injuring the fund so much the better.
A further practical problem involves the targeting of corporations
that should be invited to contribute to the fund. The number of firms
engaged in the overseas exploitation of hazardous industrial technology
is considerable. The answer may be to restrict the fund initially to an
identifiable industrial sector, such as chemicals, define "hazardous
technology" in that context, then identify the main corporate users of
such technology and invite them to become participants in the fund.
Finally, the fund may earmark a proportion of its income to assist
LDCs in financing adequate health and safety monitoring programmes,
so as to remove the excuse that lack of funds prevents such activity.
The fund may also become involved in the promotion of research and
development in industrial health and safety. These are, however,
matters that need to await the evolution of a sizeable fund.
In order to achieve its objectives the fund must offer an effective
claims procedure that is reasonably simple to activate and administer.
First, the procedure must be free from obstruction by national
authorities and laws. Consequently, it should take the form of a
standing international claims commission, set up by prior agreement
22. The fund company could only do this in jurisdictions that recognised its authority and locus
standi. Such recognition would be an automatic consequence of entry into the parent organisation
by a participating state. A non-participating state may be obliged to recognise the fund company
as a municipal juridical person: Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 3) [1991] 1 All ER 871
(HL) reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal [1990] 2 All ER 769. (When sovereign states
enter into an agreement by treaty to confer legal personality upon an international organisation, and
the United Kingdom is not a party to that agreement, the registration of that treaty in one of the
sovereign states confers legal personality on the international organisation and thus creates a
corporate body which the English courts can and should recognise as a foreign municipal juridical
person, with the capacity to bring proceedings in the English courts.)
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between all the participating states, whose powers would be recognised
by the internal laws of the participating states.
Secondly, as noted above, the fund procedure is envisaged as a
"first stop" compensation scheme. Consequently, the fund should not
be treated as a bar to subsequent national litigation against the
corporation responsible for the accident, if this offers the prospect of
higher damages. The fund should not act as a limitation fund. Once
an award has been made to the victims, the fund itself would be
empowered to sue the defendant corporation(s) (and possibly the host
state if it is a codefendant) by way of subrogation. Any damages
awarded over and above the fund award can be held by the fund as
trustee for the victims and distributed to them according to the
proportion that their claim bears to the total of claims.
Thirdly, fund awards should be made on a "no-fault" basis in the
manner of insurance payments. All the claimant has to prove is that
he, she or it suffered personal or proprietary injury as a result of the
accident. This should avoid complex legal questions concerning fault
and, in the case of a foreign owned multinational, parent company
liability for the acts of its locally incorporated subsidiary.
Finally, the proceedings of the commission should be run on an
administrative, rather than an adjudicatory, basis. Claims would be
submitted in writing to an official supervised by the commission. The
commission itself should be composed of an agreed number of legal
and other experts drawn from a panel appointed by the international
fund composed of persons from the host, home and neutral
participating countries. They would oversee the functioning of the
claims processing procedure and could give reasoned awards where
necessary. It will be necessary to draw up rules as to the
quantification of claims to be used. Like the fund, the claims
commission would also be overseen by the new international
organisation.
Thus far, the proposal has been considered without reference to
the role of human rights standards as an active element in the
operation of the fund. First, as noted above, such standards can have
an important role to play by offering a justification for the existence
of the fund, it being an institutional and operational expression of the
accident victim's right to an effective remedy. Secondly, there is
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1993
room in the operation of the fund for an institutional policy of respect
for human rights as an aspect of the right to development. In
particular, the proposed role of the fund as a focus for research into
industrial safety, and for assistance to LDCs in health and safety
matters, can prompt action designed to increase awareness of the
obligations of such countries, and of the corporations operating within
them, to observe relevant human rights standards. In this connection,
there is scope for introducing consultation with people affected by the
operations of MNEs in less developed host states as an element of the
fund's research.
However, as noted above, such developments depend on the
growth of sufficient financial resources within the fund to allow for a
diversification of activities beyond those immediately associated with
the compensation of accident victims. There is also a danger that the
fund could lose essential support from LDCs and MNEs if it were to
go too far beyond its narrow purpose of providing compensation and
technical assistance, and to engage in the more general discourse of
human rights and the right to development. The continuity between
respect for human rights as the motivation for the fund and its more
technical activities should be stressed, but not to the point where
discussion over the right to development, and its content in relation to
industrial health and safety, takes over the fund's work. A balance
would have to be found between formulating health and safety policy
in the light of human rights standards and the immediate task of
compensating victims.
However, even in relation to the immediate task of compensation,
an approach based on respect for the interests of the victims, requiring
consultation with them, would be a significant principle of action
based on human rights standards. The compensation of accident
victims may have to go beyond simply making good the financial loss
to the victim and/or his dependents. As the Bhopal case shows, there
may be substantial loss to the community as a whole. As much as it
needs to put right damage caused by the accident to the physical
infrastructure, the human community may need special services,
medical and social, to heal itself. In a developed country the
resources and the means to do so usually exist. However, in the case
of an LDC, the lack of resources means that the fund may need to
200
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assist in the rebuilding process. In this there is an opportunity to
revitalise a community and, possibly, to improve it. Such a task
should not be taken on without consultation with the affected
population, as its vital interests are at stake.
Herein lies a further danger to the fund. LDCs may prefer to go
without the assistance it could offer if the fund were perceived as an
outside element that had the potential to effect changes within the
community on the basis of local consultation alone, thereby
challenging the sovereignty and effectiveness of the local government.
Clearly, the host state would have to be engaged in the process of
consultation. However, the potential for conflict over the application
of funds is foreseeable, where local opinion differs from government
policy. In this respect, the fund could find itself in deep political
waters.
IV. Conclusion
This article has suggested an approach to the compensation of
victims of major industrial accidents in developing countries that is not
without its major difficulties. In particular, the introduction of human
rights standards as a guide to the wider activities of the fund could
create political tensions that the narrower object of acting as no more
than a victim's compensation fund would not. The constituent
assembly of the international organisation, charged with the
supervision of the fund, would play an important role in ensuring that
such tensions do not incapacitate the fund. Some will no doubt
dismiss this proposal as fanciful. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the
proposal will generate constructive criticism from which the
beginnings of a workable scheme will emerge.

